Coming to Grips With the Past: Effect of Repeated Simulation on the Perceived Plausibility of Episodic Counterfactual Thoughts by De Brigard, Felipe et al.
 
Coming to Grips With the Past: Effect of Repeated Simulation on
the Perceived Plausibility of Episodic Counterfactual Thoughts
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation De Brigard, F., K. K. Szpunar, and D. L. Schacter. 2013. “Coming
to Grips With the Past: Effect of Repeated Simulation on the
Perceived Plausibility of Episodic Counterfactual Thoughts.”
Psychological Science 24 (7) (May 14): 1329–1334.
doi:10.1177/0956797612468163.
Published Version doi:10.1177/0956797612468163
Accessed February 17, 2015 4:57:01 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13415207
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPComing to grips with the past: Effect of repeated simulation on
the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts
Felipe De Brigard, Karl K. Szpunar, and Daniel L. Schacter
Harvard University, Department of Psychology
Abstract
When people revisit previous experiences they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking:
mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The
present study employs a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated
simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactual
thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical
memories. One week later, they re-simulated self-generated upward, downward, and neutral
counterfactual alternatives to those memories either once or four times. The results indicate that
repeated simulation of upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases
their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of ease, detail, and valence. This finding
suggests differences between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential
simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and non-pathological anxiety are
discussed.
Introduction
People frequently revisit their past experiences. Often times, such revisions lead to episodic
counterfactual thoughts: mental simulations about how specific personal past events might
have been (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Kray et al., 2010; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012;).
Considerable research has focused on the affective consequences of revisiting counterfactual
simulations. It is well known, for instance, that ruminating about how bad things could have
turned out better—upward counterfactuals—tends to elicit feelings of regret and
disappointment (Landman, 1993). Conversely, thinking about how good things could have
turned out worse—downward counterfactuals—tends to elicit feelings of relief and
satisfaction (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1995; Mandel et al., 2005).
Nonetheless, little is known about how repeated counterfactual simulation affects our beliefs
about such imagined alternative events. In particular, little is known as to whether or not
revisiting episodic counterfactual thoughts may affect our judgment of how plausible it is
that the imagined event could have occurred.
On the one hand, it is possible that repeated simulation of episodic counterfactual events
could lead to an increase in their perceived plausibility. A number of studies have
demonstrated that repeated simulations of possible future events leads people to believe that
those events are more likely to occur (Carroll, 1978; Anderson, 1983; Gregory, Cialdini, &
Carpneter, 1982; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985; for review, see
Koehler, 1991), with this effect being more prevalent for emotional than non-emotional
events (Szpunar & Schacter, in press). Moreover, Szpunar and Schacter (in press) have
shown that repetition enhances the level of detail and ease of simulation, and that such
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tincreases are associated with a higher degree of perceived plausibility for possible future
events. As a result, it may be the case that repeated simulation of counterfactual thoughts, by
way of enhancing their level of detail and ease of simulation, could produce a similar
increment in perceived plausibility.
On the other hand, unlike simulation of possible future events, generating counterfactual
thoughts involves a mental contrast between the event that actually occurred and the
alternative imagined possibility (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). In that sense,
counterfactual thinking is constrained by reality in a way that future thinking is not.
Repeated simulation may then bring discrepancies between the actual and the possible
events more sharply into focus, inviting people to reconsider the amount of modifications
that would have been required in order for the imagined event to have occurred. This, in
turn, may effect people’s assessment of the likelihood of the counterfactual event, leading to
a decrease rather than an increase in their perceived plausibility. Indeed, that rumination of
episodic counterfactual events may lead to a decrease on their perceived plausibility might
constitute a psychologically adaptive strategy, insofar as it would help people to come to
grips with the way things were rather than inviting them to focus on how things might have
been.
The main purpose of the present study is to try to adjudicate between these two alternative
hypotheses by examining the effect of repeated simulation on novel episodic counterfactual
thoughts. In addition, the current study examines whether or not the emotional direction of
the counterfactual simulation influences the relation between repeated simulation and
perceived plausibility. Finally, this study also examines whether or not the perceived
plausibility of counterfactual simulations is related to the amount of detail and ease of
simulation, as it has been argued for in the case of episodic future thinking (Anderson,
1983).
Method
Thirty-seven undergraduates participated in this study. Due to insufficient number of
observations in seven participants (see below), data from thirty participants were analyzed
(M age = 20.57, SD = 2.08; 15 females). The study consisted of three sessions. In session 1,
participants generated 35 negative, 35 positive and 35 neutral autobiographical memories.
For each memory, participants typed a short description, a title, as well as the name of a
person (other than themselves) involved in the remembered event, the location where the
event took place, and an object featured in the memory. One week later, participants
returned to the lab for an episodic counterfactual simulation session. Participants were told
that they would be engaging in three kinds of counterfactual simulations: upward, downward
and neutral, as indicated by screen headings. When the heading was “Upward”, participants
were presented with the person, place, object, and title components from one of the negative
memories collected in session 1. Their task was to imagine an alternative better way in
which the cued negative memory could have occurred. Participants were allotted 12.5
seconds to simulate this episodic counterfactual event. Participants were then prompted to
write a short new title for their counterfactual simulation. They were told this new title
would help them remember the event they just imagined. Conversely, when the heading was
“Downward”, participants were presented with the person, place, object, and title
components from a positive memory, and were asked to imagine an alternative worse way in
which the cued positive memory could have occurred. Finally, when the heading was
“Neutral”, participants were presented with the person, place, object, and title components
from a neutral memory and were asked to simply imagine an alternative way in which the
same event could have occurred, so that it would not have altered the emotional value of the
actual event at all. Participants simulated 30 Upward, 30 Downward, and 30 Neutral
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tepisodic counterfactuals in random order, plus 3 counterfactuals from each kind during a
practice session, to ensure participant’s adherence to the instructions (Figure 1).
The third session took place one day later. This session consisted of two parts. In the first
part, participants were asked to re-simulate 15 upward, 15 downward and 15 neutral
counterfactuals in random order, and three times each. These 45 counterfactuals were
randomly selected from the counterfactuals they simulated the day before. Following the
parameters in session two, participants were presented with the heading of the
counterfactual’s direction (i.e., “Upward”, “Downward”, “Neutral), the person, place and
object components, the new title they wrote the day before, and were given 12.5 seconds to
re-simulate each event. Participants were explicitly asked to re-simulate the very same
counterfactual they generated the day before. After a 10-minute break, during which
participants engaged in a distraction task (Sudoku or word puzzle) aimed at preventing them
from re-entertaining recently rehearsed simulations, participants re-simulated all 30 upward,
30 downward and 30 neutral counterfactuals. This portion of the experiment was introduced
as a recognition test. Participants were told that the main task was to respond whether or not
they had simulated each particular counterfactual event earlier that day (i.e., 10 minutes
earlier). In addition, they completed five 5-point phenomenological ratings presented
randomly: Detail (1 = few details, 5 = many details), Ease (1 = very difficult to imagine, 5 =
very easy to imagine), Valence during simulation (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive) and,
importantly, Plausibility (1 = very implausible, 5 = very plausible) and Novelty of the
simulation (1 = Not novel, 5 = Novel). For the rating of Plausibility, participants were asked
to judge how plausible they thought it was that the imagined event could have occurred as
they simulated it. Finally, since the purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of
repeated simulation in novel episodic counterfactual thoughts, a comment on this rating is
important. The Novelty rating was used to get a sense of which counterfactual simulations
participants had previously thought about and which were simulated for the first time during
the experiment (the entire scale was: 1 = absolutely sure not novel, 2 = pretty sure not novel,
3 = not sure, 4 = pretty sure novel, and 5 = absolutely sure novel). Post-experimental
interviews indicated that the recognition test (Hit Rate = .98) and additional ratings
successfully masked the real purpose of the study, i.e., examining the effect of repeated
simulation in the subjective plausibility of novel episodic counterfactual thoughts.
Results
Only counterfactuals that participants had not entertained previously (i.e., novelty rating of
3–5) were analyzed. Participants that did not have at least 4 observations of each kind of
counterfactual simulation per condition were excluded1, so data from a total of 30
participants are reported. For simulations repeated 4 times, participants contributed on
average 9.967 (SD = 3.03) downward, 7.667 (SD = 2.71) upward, and 10.767 (SD = 3.47)
neutral counterfactuals. For simulations repeated only once, participants contributed on
average 10.200 (SD = 2.62) downward, 8.600 (SD = 2.74) upward, and 11.033 (SD = 2.89)
neutral counterfactuals. Although participants produced on average fewer upward than both
downward and neutral counterfactuals, F (2, 28) = 7.934, p < .01, η 2 = .362, there was no
difference between the number of repetitions (p > .05).
1Notably, participants judged the novelty of counterfactual thoughts after the repetition manipulation in order to avoid biasing
participants away from generating realistic counterfactuals. However, it is possible that participants may have rated fewer
counterfactuals as novel following repeated simulation as familiarity associated with those counterfactuals may have increased
throughout the experiment, reducing the number of observations we were able to include in our analysis. Nonetheless, a conservative
cutoff was adopted to eliminate samples in which participant’s produced fewer observations than two SD from the M, as this could
artificially skew the variance for the weighted average.
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tTable 1 presents the mean phenomenological ratings for upward, downward and neutral
episodic counterfactual simulations as a function of event repetition. For the Plausibility
rating, a 3 (Direction: downward, upward, neutral) × 2 (Repetition: 4 times, 1 time)
ANOVA revealed main effects of Direction, F(2, 28) = 41.895, p < .001, η 2 = .750, and
Repetition, F(1, 29) = 17.023, p < .001, η 2 = .370, with no interaction (p = .379). With
regard to direction, post-hoc contrasts revealed that neutral episodic counterfactuals were
rated as more plausible than both upward, t(29) = 9.137, p < .001, d = 1.91, and downward
episodic counterfactuals, t(29) = 7.489, p < .001, d = 1.77, and that downward episodic
counterfactuals were rated as more plausible than upward episodic counterfactuals, t(29) =
1.959, p < .05, d = .29. Critically, episodic counterfactual thoughts simulated four times
were judged as less plausible than those simulated only once.
Additional 3 (Direction) × 2 (Repetition) ANOVAS were conducted for the other
phenomenological ratings. For the Detail, Ease, and Valence ratings there were main effects
of Direction, smallest F(2, 28) = 4.264, p < .05, η 2 = .233, and Repetition, smallest F(1, 29)
= 4.410, p < .05, η 2 = .132, with no interactions (largest p = .398). For Detail, upward, t(29)
= 2.485, p < .05, d = 0.43, and downward, t(29) = 4.510, p < .001, d = 0.69, episodic
counterfactuals were more detailed than neural episodic counterfactuals, and there was no
difference between downward and upward episodic counterfactuals (p = .169). For Ease,
only downward episodic counterfactuals came to mind more easily than neutral episodic
counterfactuals, t(29) = 2.969, p < .01, d = 0.23. For Valence, downward episodic
counterfactuals were more negative than upward, t(29) = 2.201, p < .01, d = .74, and neutral,
t(29) = 2.893, p < .01, d = 0.71, episodic counterfactuals, and there was no difference
between upward versus neutral episodic counterfactuals (p = .274). With regard to repetition
for these three ratings, upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactuals are simulated
with more detail, more easily, and more positively after four repetitions than after just one
repetition. Finally, for the ratings of Novelty there were no effects.
Discussion
The main purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of repeated simulation of
novel episodic counterfactual thoughts on their perceived plausibility. Our results indicate
that episodic counterfactual thoughts that were simulated repeatedly were judged as less
plausible to have occurred than those that were simulated only once. These results contrast
with extant evidence on future thinking, which suggests that the perceived plausibility of
imagined possible future events increases as a function of repeated simulations (Anderson,
1983; Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al., 1982; Sherman et al., 1985; Szpunar & Schacter, in
press). In addition, the current study examined whether or not the direction of the
counterfactual mutation (i.e., upward, downward) influenced the effect of repeated
simulation on the perceived plausibility of novel episodic counterfactual thoughts. Our
results did not reveal any interaction between the direction of the counterfactual mutation
and the effect of repetition. As such, the evidence gathered here suggests that repeated
simulation reduces the perceived plausibility of novel episodic counterfactual thoughts
independently of the direction of the mutation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
repeated simulation did have an effect on the valence with which the counterfactuals were
experienced (i.e., repeated counterfactuals were more positive than non-repeated
counterfactuals), and that future research should examine whether valence and perceived
plausibility interact in some other fashion.
Our study also examined whether or not the perceived plausibility of counterfactual
simulations is related to the amount of detail and ease of simulation. The results indicate that
although the perceived plausibility of counterfactual thoughts decreased as a function of
repeated simulation, both ratings of detail and ease increased, replicating similar patterns in
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tfuture thinking (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). This pattern suggests that an increase in perceived
plausibility of possible events is not an inevitable consequence of an increase in detail and
ease of simulation.
What accounts for this divergence? One possibility, derived from the mental models view on
counterfactual generation (Byrne, 1997; Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), is that
when people generate episodic counterfactual thoughts they contrast a mental representation
of what is “true” or what is the “norm”—which in the case of episodic counterfactual
thoughts would be an autobiographical episodic recollection—with another mental
representation that minimally deviates from the first one. This hypothesis explains, for
instance, why people tend to mutate close versus temporally distant events (Miller &
Gunasegaram, 1990) or actions versus inactions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982): all such
mental mutations involve less divergence from the “normal” or “true” representation. The
same may occur for episodic counterfactual thinking: when we first generate a
counterfactual simulation the divergence from the actual memory is minimal, so the
perceived plausibility is higher. But when more attention can be allocated to further details
of the mutation, the divergence from the actual memory increases, thereby rendering it less
plausible to the individual. In contrast, in the case of future thinking, there is no “norm” or
“true” representation against which to contrast the mental simulation, so there is no
divergence that could affect the perceived plausibility of the imagined event. The same line
of reasoning can be applied to the finding that repeatedly imagining past events that never
occurred increases the subjective likelihood that they did occur (“imagination inflation”; see
Garry et al., 1996), because there is no “true” event available for contrast.
That the perceived plausibility of what could have happened reduces as a function of
repeated pondering about such ‘what-ifs’ may actually be healthy. Research has shown that
increased counterfactual thinking is associated with anxiety and excessive nervousness
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rachman et al., 2000; Roese et al, 2008). Perhaps, in non-
pathological cases, rumination helps bring into focus increasingly divergent details of the
counterfactual event in the hopes that, when contrasted with what actually occurred, its
perceived plausibility decreases, along with the need for further pondering. Conversely, in
pathological cases, there may not be such decrease in perceived plausibility, which may
contribute to excessive rumination. Whether or not this is the case remains an open question,
and one that merits further research.
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tFigure 1.
Example of reported autobiographical memories, stimulus displays during counterfactual
construction and counterfactual generation. The top row shows examples of negative,
positive and neutral memories. The second row shows examples of upward, downward and
neutral counterfactual generation. Participants saw the person, place and object of their
reported memories plus the title they gave to that memory (shown in blue). The title of the
screen (shown in green) indicated the direction of the counterfactual mutation, with upward
for negative, downward for positive and neutral for neutral memories. The third row
illustrates examples of counterfactuals generated by participants, with the short description
of the counterfactual mutation shown in red.
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Table 1
Mean phenomenological ratings for upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactual simulations as a
function of event repetition
Downward Upward Neutral
Plausibility
4 Times
1 Time
2.857 (.70)
3.022 (.66)
2.587 (.86)
2.891 (.84)
3.856 (.49)
3.931 (.45)
Detail
4 Times
1 Time
3.687 (.63)
3.287 (.65)
3.613 (.71)
3.105 (.78)
3.213 (.79)
2.972 (.67)
Ease
4 Times
1 Time
4.078 (.69)
3.684 (.67)
3.957 (.78)
3.515 (.89)
3.847 (.80)
3.290 (.73)
Valence
4 Times
1 Time
2.593 (.96)
2.477 (1.02)
3.229 (.93)
3.164 (.75)
3.080 (.22)
2.991 (.24)
Novelty
4 Times
1 Times
4.169 (.41)
4.237 (.44)
4.065 (.46)
3.978 (.51)
4.094 (.62)
4.057 (.65)
Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 October 31.